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Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary alternative to mainstream environmental economics.  
Attempts have been made to outline a methodology for ecological economics and it is probably 
fair to say that, at this point, ecological economics takes a ￿pluralistic￿ approach (see Norgaard, 
1989).  There are, however, some common methodological themes that run through the 
ecological economics literature.  This paper argues that the works of Adolph Lowe and Robert 
Heilbroner can inform the development of some of those themes. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS IN THE WORKS OF LOWE AND HEILBRONER 
 
Adolph Lowe and Robert Heilbroner both were aware of environmental-economic challenges 
from remarkably early on, and these issues gained an increasingly important place in their 
thought over the years.  In his 1935 Economics and Sociology, Lowe wrote that: 
In every epoch of human civilization, economic forces and institutions have deeply influenced 
the structure and evolution of society as a whole.  But in modern history the economic process is, 
as we have seen, the dominant factor￿ The technique of the industrial age has broken through 
the traditional borders between the social and the natural world and has subjected more and more 
sections of organic and inorganic nature to human influence.  This expansion, however, has 
reacted on the psychological and institutional constituents of modern society in a strange way.  
The more nature has become socialized, the more society has become naturalized. (Lowe, 1935, 
p. 153) 
 
This idea that the economic system and economic process transforms not only the social, 
technical, and institutional, but also the natural environment, and that the latter therefore cannot 
be taken as ￿given￿ in economic analysis, remained an important theme in Lowe￿s work for the 
remainder of his life and influenced Heilbroner￿s own thinking.  This position￿already 
articulated in Lowe￿s early work￿was crucial for both authors￿ thinking about the relation of 
the economy and the natural environment, and the impact of economic processes on the natural 
environment. 
Heilbroner also expressed awareness of environmental challenges from an early date.  In 
1950, three years before the publication of his first book and thirteen years before he received 
his Ph.D., he wrote an article for Harper￿s Magazine called ￿What Goes Up the Chimney,￿ 
inspired by the famous Donora incident.  In the article, Heilbroner outlines the problems of 
pollution, its causes, and recommends some possible policies.  Among his suggestions, he writes 
that ￿we must force large industry to add to its smoke-control equipment,￿ ￿we need better  
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smoke prevention,￿ and ￿we need smoke control enforcement.￿  This, twenty years before the 
first Earth Day. 
  While Lowe and Heilbroner both expressed awareness of environmental-economic 
challenges from very early on, in the late 1960s it moved to an even more prominent place in 
their thinking, with concern increasing over the next decades.  In a widely reprinted 1970 
article, ￿Ecological Armageddon,￿ Heilbroner writes that ￿[t]he ecological issue￿may indeed 
constitute the most dangerous and difficult challenge that humanity has ever faced￿ (p. 270) and 
calls ￿the ecological crisis, unquestionably the gravest long-run threat of our times￿ (p. 285).  
He speaks of ￿[t]he necessity to bring our economic activities into a sustainable relationship 
with the resource capabilities and waste-absorption properties of the world,￿ and insists that 
￿[t]he cult of disposability must be replaced by that of reusability,￿ writing that ￿[m]any of these 
problems will tax our ingenuity, technical and socio-political, but the main problem they pose is 
not whether, but how soon, they can be solved￿ (1970, pp. 281-282).  Throughout this period, 
Heilbroner devoted considerable thought to the environmental challenge, including his frank 
testimony before the U. S. Congress on the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1974 
(Heilbroner, 1974b; see also, e.g., Heilbroner, 1972; 1973). 
  Lowe￿s increasing concern in the same period was inspired by his reading Geoffrey 
Vickers￿ book, Freedom in a Rocking Boat.  In a 1968 letter to Vickers, Lowe writes: 
[T]he significance of the book for my own work lies in￿your emphasis on ecology in the widest 
sense, and on the limits this sets to ￿progress￿.  As several times before, your work is a most 
important corrective for my own thinking, and after having digested your warnings I shall have 
to modify a good deal of what I have been provisionally committing to paper. (Vickers, 1991, p. 
51) 
 
From the late sixties and early seventies and onward, there is an explicit attempt by 
Lowe to incorporate environmental factors into his analysis.  Thus, Part III of his 1976 book, 
The Path of Economic Growth is devoted to the analysis of natural resource inputs and the 
recycling of the residuals of both consumption and production.  In his ￿Postscript￿ to the 
updated edition of his On Economic Knowledge, published one year later (1977), Lowe would 
write: 
Recognition of the ecological triad￿population explosion, gradual exhaustion of essential 
material resources, and progressive deterioration of the environment￿has radically changed this 
picture [of economic growth]￿[T]here is at this point no conceivable solution that would not 
imply a gradual reduction of the growth rate of the mature economies￿[S]imultaneous industrial 
progress in all regions of the globe may well be incompatible with the available and even the 
potential supply of natural resources.  Even more important, the ecosphere may not be able to  
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absorb the heat that the energy required for universal industrialization will emit.  The answer can 
only be a gradual redistribution of the world￿s resources in favor of non-Western 
regions￿resulting in a deceleration of Western economic expansion. (1977, pp. 340-41) 
 
In the meantime, Heilbroner￿s own position expressed in the 1970 article was more fully 
elaborated in An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (1974a; hereafter HP).  In HP, he includes 
population growth and environmental crisis as two of the three great challenges facing humanity 
in the 21
st century.  While Heilbroner feels that problems stemming from population growth and 
war might be avoided, he considers the environmental challenge as being in another category: 
[T]here is an ultimate certitude about the problem of environmental deterioration that places it in 
another category from the dangers we previously examined￿[U]ltimately there is an absolute 
limit to the ability of the earth to support or tolerate the process of industrial activity, and there is 
reason to believe we are now moving toward that limit very rapidly. (1974a, p. 47) 
 
In his Afterword added to the 1980 edition, Heilbroner affirmed his view that ￿the 
crucial element today, as eight years ago, remains the environment￿the ability of the planet to 
sustain the mushrooming of industrial output and to absorb the destruction that is the 
consequence of that vast human effort.￿ (1980, p. 67).  And in his comments added to the 1991 
edition, he remarks that ￿If anything, there is an uncomfortable feeling that environmental 
challenges are becoming worse,￿ although he adds with some hope that environmental 
awareness is also on the rise (1991, p. 75-76). 
  By 1988, Lowe￿s position had also solidified in this regard.  In Has Freedom a Future? 
he writes: 
[W]e find ourselves confronted with a host of difficulties that make it doubtful whether, in the 
long run, even the new technological revolution can achieve the required rate of economic 
growth.  The impediments of which we are speaking are ecological: the triad of worldwide 
population explosion, gradual exhaustion of essential material resources, and the pollution of the 
environment.  The significance of this complex is much wider than the context in which I 
introduce it here.  Though slow in its advance, it may over the long run greatly modify 
mankind￿s style of life.  All I want to demonstrate here, is that even under the most optimistic 
assumptions, it is an ecological factor that may ultimately block the growth of the west, as it is 
conventionally understood. (1988, pp. 48-49) 
 
Heilbroner￿s position, too, has become increasingly clear in this recent period.  In 1992, 
in his Foreword to the Gaia Atlas of Green Economics, Heilbroner embraces the 
￿core￿insistence￿ that ￿economics cannot be considered separately from￿ecological 
concerns￿ (1992, p. 5). 
  
 4
Adolph Lowe and Robert Heilbroner have both clearly understood the challenges that 
humanity faces regarding the environment.  Both expressed concerns long before economics as 
a discipline or society at large began to address these issues.  And by the time the environmental 
challenges were more widely recognized, both were at the forefront in insisting that 
environmental issues be placed high on the agenda of economists and policymakers.  Awareness 
of these and related concerns is what motivated the founding and development of ecological 
economics.  Full consideration of biophysical and ecological realities leads to sustainability 
conditions or rules for a sustainable economy. 
  The insights of Lowe and Heilbroner are akin to those found and elaborated in the 
ecological economics￿ literature.  Most ecological economists recognize that ecological and 
biophysical realities impose certain conditions on economic activity if sustainability is to be 
achieved (see, e.g., Lawn, 2001; Holmberg, et al., 1996; Prugh, et al., 2000).  This recognition 
has lead to investigations of the appropriate methodological foundations for ecological 
economics.  But it is not only their work that explicitly addresses the environment or relates to 
environmental challenges that is relevant to the concerns of ecological economists.  Heilbroner￿s 
Worldly Philosophy and Lowe￿s Political Economics offer insights that may prove useful in 
developing a methodology of ecological economics. 
 
ADOLPH LOWE AND HEILBRONER￿S WORLDLY PHILOSOPHY 
 
As readers of Heilbroner￿s The Worldly Philosophers (1953) may recall, Heilbroner became 
interested in the lives, times, and ideas of the great political economists after registering for a 
class on Smith, Ricardo, and Marx at the New School for Social Research in the mid-forties 
with Adolph Lowe.  It was not simply that Lowe inspired an interest in political economy; 
Heilbroner adopted Lowe￿s basic vision as outlined in the latter￿s Economics and Sociology, his 
article ￿The Classical Theory of Economic Growth￿ (1954), and related writings.  This included 
not only the interpretation of the great Classical Political Economists such as Smith, Ricardo, 
and Marx (both considered Marx in many ways the zenith of Classical Political Economy), but 
the interpretation of later writers such as Keynes, Schumpeter, and Veblen as fundamentally in 
this same tradition, and the sharp contrasting of this tradition with that of neoclassical 
economics, with its ahistorical, overly formalist, methodological individualist, and positivist 
character.  
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For Lowe, the static equilibrium models of neoclassical economics were inadequate to 
analyze the ￿dynamic chain of reciprocal causation￿ at work in industrial capitalism (Lowe, 
1935, pp. 138-39).  Instead, what was required was a theoretical approach that could endogenize 
the structural factors taken as given in standard presentations.  Economic analysis must be 
accompanied ￿by a theory of the evolution of its￿data￿ since ￿[t]he essential variations of those 
data [are] effected￿ by economic processes themselves (Lowe, 1935, pp. 93-96).  Lowe was 
even dissatisfied with twentieth century work on economic dynamics precisely due to the fact 
that the ￿time honored distinction between dependent and independent variables ￿ that is, 
between an economic process and the underlying meta-economic forces which drive it on and 
change it ￿ is generally maintained￿ (Lowe, 1954, p. 128).  Even ￿dynamic process analysis￿ 
was ￿but a dim reflection￿ of what is found in the classics and Marx (Lowe, 1954, p. 128).  In 
fact, Lowe argued that it is the ￿issue of endogeneity versus exogeneity, rather than conflicting 
theories of value￿ that separates ￿genuine classical theory￿ from ￿post-Millian economic 
reasoning, including all versions of neoclassical analysis￿ (Lowe, 1954, p. 129).  The issue 
regards: 
the entire possible range of deductive reasoning.  Let us be quite clear about the disputed region.  
It concerns the whole natural, social and technical environment of the economic system... 
and...the changes in these elements through time. [For the Classical Economists and Marx] the 
explanation of the order and changes of these data itself formed part of the theoretical work of 
economists. (Lowe, 1954, pp. 129-30) 
 
For Lowe, then, the classical economists applied their method over a much wider 
range than the neoclassical authors, to include the social-historical and environmental 
context of economic processes.  Thus, for Lowe an evolutionary approach would aim to 
once again ￿extend the range [of analysis]... to the sphere of the natural and social data of 
the market process, and thus to facilitate an estimate of the direction and limits of possible 
dynamic changes of the system as a whole￿ (1935, p. 67).  In this view, the classical 
approach considers areas thought to be outside the scope of economics in the neoclassical 
view￿areas falling broadly under the headings of the social-historical and environmental 
contexts of economic processes￿as legitimate targets of analysis (for more on this, see 
Forstater, 2003). 
This dynamic, sweeping vision of capitalism as a deterministic social system where 
impersonal forces move history and endogenous processes result in ongoing systemic 
transformation was clearly adopted by Heilbroner.  In The Worldly Philosophers, he  
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outlined their dramatic scenarios depicting the almost inexorable movement of the capitalist 
system, with its ￿laws of motion￿￿systematic tendencies leading to some predetermined 
conclusion.  Underlying the system￿s movement were a variety of factors, both economic 
and non-economic.  In other words, the trajectory of the system was inseparable from the 
wider sociopolitical and environmental context within which the economy is situated. 
  In his analysis, Heilbroner adopted his own versions of Schumpeter￿s (1954) notions of 
￿vision￿ and ￿analysis.￿  Whereas for Schumpeter (also a former professor of Heilbroner) 
analysis had a kind of ￿cleansing￿ effect, which prevented the necessarily ideological nature of 
the ￿pre-analytical cognitive act￿ from tainting the scientific endeavor, for Heilbroner economic 
theory is inescapably value-laden.  Biases are always present, at times lurking just beneath the 
surface but often emerging in the form of assumptions that determine the content of their 
analytical categories and the direction of their prognostications, thus the importance of his 
notions of scenario, vision, analysis, and ideology.  A scenario is a ￿complex 
narrative...combining many prognoses￿ (Heilbroner, 1990, p. 1111).  Visions are not scenarios; 
rather, they are ￿the source, but not the determinants of social prognoses￿ (Heilbroner, 1990, p. 
1111).  Neither are visions the result of scenarios; they are ￿pre-analytical.￿  The directions of 
the prognoses are the result of logical analysis, which, however, can never be completely 
independent of either vision or ideology.  Scenarios thus ￿combine powerful analytical 
frameworks with highly personalized visions concerning the motives and behaviors of the actors 
within those frameworks￿ (Heilbroner, 1993, p. 122).  The distinction between vision and 
ideology depends on whether one￿s pre-conceptions and sociopolitical orientation are made 
explicit, or whether they are hidden and even denied: ￿That which we call ideology is therefore 
perhaps best understood as unrecognized vision, and that which I call vision as consciously 
embraced ideology.￿ (Heilbroner, 1994, p. 329) 
In recent years, Heilbroner has questioned whether, under present contemporary 
circumstances, ￿Worldly Philosophy￿ is still possible.  He believes that scenarios and visions do 
not lend themselves to formal analytical procedures.  More importantly, he believes that the 
economic behaviors that set the system on its path have become less dependable, while political 
intervention has become more strategic.  Lowe, too, by the mid-fifties, began to develop the 
thesis that historical changes in the structure of capitalist society had altered the object of 
inquiry in such a way as to necessitate the abandoning of the traditional approach, requiring that 
analysis henceforth be conducted within an alternative, ￿instrumental￿ methodological  
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framework.  Rather than taking only the initial conditions as given and addressing theory to 
predicting outcomes, Lowe proposed also taking as given a pre-determined end-state: a vision of 
the desired outcomes.  The task then becomes the derivation￿the discovery￿of the technical 
and social path(s) by which these outcomes might be achieved (structural analysis), the 
behavioral and motivational patterns capable of setting the system onto a suitable path (force 
analysis), the environmental context(s) capable of encouraging or inducing these patterns, and 
policies shaping/creating the environmental context(s). 
Heilbroner similarly came to the conclusion that an instrumental approach, in Lowe￿s 
sense, had become more appropriate, with ￿blueprints depicting possible routes from present 
realities to desired destinations￿ replacing ￿scenarios depicting a future immanent in the 
present￿ (Heilbroner, 1992, p. 381; see also, Heilbroner and Milberg, 1995, pp. 118ff; Forstater, 
1999).  A key issue for Heilbroner is the increasing ￿openness￿ of the system.  The determinism 
of the Classical system was rooted in ￿laws￿ which were seen to govern relations between such 
factors as population (labor supply), subsistence (wages), natural resources, employment, and 
technical change.  The ￿iron law of wages,￿ the ￿law of population,￿ ￿the (Classical) law of 
diminishing returns,￿ were seen as natural, so unalterable.  As Lowe observed, in the Classical 
era, ￿impersonal forces or ￿laws￿ which might be observed or interpreted, but which could not 
be altered￿ appeared to govern such relations, but scientific and technological advance later 
transformed most of these law-like relations into variable ones, capable of human influence: 
￿That which once ￿happened,￿ can now be made to happen, or prevented from happening￿ 
(Lowe, 1971, p. 568).  Furthermore, having created the technological potential to both induce 
and prevent disaster, humankind has ￿no alternative to accepting the challenge of the new era￿: 
In the face of this tremendous enlargement of human capabilities, there is no possibility of 
turning away.  Even doing nothing, or outlawing the advance of our further capabilities, would 
be as much an act of intervention as exploiting our newfound capabilities to our utmost. (Lowe, 
1971, p. 568) 
 
More than anything else, it may be this existential predicament that concerns Heilbroner.  
As Lowe put it: ￿From now on, the future will have to be more and more the result of our 
deliberate choices, at every level of human activity￿ (Lowe, 1988, p. 2). 
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THE METHODOLOGY OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
 
  The methodology of ecological economics utilizes the notions of vision, analysis 
(including structural analysis), scenarios, and implementation (synthesis): 
￿making sustainability operational requires the integration of three elements: (1) a practical, 
shared vision of both the way the world works and of the sustainable society we wish to achieve; 
(2) methods of analysis and modeling to the new questions and problems this vision embodies; 
and (3) new institutions and instruments that can effectively use the analyses to adequately 
implement the vision. (Costanza, et al., 1996, p. 1) 
 
This is reflected in the section headings of the book from which the above quote is taken, 
Getting Down to Earth, a key text in ecological economics.  Chapters in the book are organized 
under three themes: ￿Vision,￿ ￿Analysis,￿ and ￿Implementation￿ (1996, Table of Contents). 
Ecological economists are virtually unanimous in their view that work must begin with 
vision: 
If most policy discussion focuses on implementation, virtually all the rest focuses on modeling 
and information.  This leaves just about no room for the remaining step of policy formation, 
which should be first￿the establishment of clear, feasible, socially shared goals. (Meadows, 
1996, p. 118) 
 
It is no surprise, then that one of the most common methodological principles found in 
ecological economics regards the importance and necessity of vision: 
A broad, overlapping consensus is forming around the goal of sustainability, including its 
ecological, social, and economic aspects￿ But movement toward this goal is being impeded not 
so much by lack of knowledge, or even lack of ￿political will,￿ but by a lack of a coherent, 
relatively detailed, shared vision of what a sustainable society would actually look like.  
Developing this shared vision is an essential prerequisite to generating any movement toward it.  
The default vision of continued, unlimited growth in material consumption is inherently 
unsustainable, but we cannot break away from this vision until a credible and desirable 
alternative is available. (Costanza, et al., 1997, pp. 177-178) 
 
Note the similarities between Costanza, et al.￿s notion of the ￿default vision￿ and Lowe￿s 
argument, quoted above, that ￿even doing nothing￿would be as much an act of intervention.￿   
Here we see that the notion of vision, which many ecological economists￿like  
Heilbroner￿explicitly draw from Schumpeter, is used both as a means of deconstructing the 
inadequacies of the mainstream approach and building a positive alternative.  Lawn writes that: 
in many ways, the development of an ecological economic paradigm has been a concerted 
attempt to overhaul the standard neoclassical approach by bringing the many false ￿pre-
analytical visions￿ underpinning its assumptions into line with biophysical and existential 
realities. (Lawn, 2001, p. 3)  
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But the ecological economist must be careful that recognizing the biophysical realities 
does not result in being overwhelmed by them: ￿Responsible vision must acknowledge, but not 
get crushed by, the physical constraints of the real world￿ (Costanza, et al., 1997, pp. 179). 
  As with Heilbroner and Schumpeter, ecological economists view vision as ￿pre-
analytical.￿  Visions are not the result of analysis, and crafting a vision requires imagination: 
Building a responsible, desirable vision of a sustainable world is partly a rational process, subject 
to analysis of what is possible over what time frame.  But it is also a non-rational or perhaps 
supra-rational task of imagination, one that comes not only from logic but from values. 
(Meadows, 1996, p. 117) 
 
As Prugh, et al., put it: ￿The rational process of figuring out how to achieve a sustainable 
world must begin with a nonrational act of imagination￿ (Prugh, et al., 2000, p. 41).  As we will 
see, nonrational mind will play an important role also in analysis and scenario-building as well. 
But what is being developed here is not some kind of vision/science dichotomy: ￿This 
need for appropriate vision applies to every aspect of human endeavor.  Far from being immune 
to this need for vision, science itself is particularly dependent on it￿ (Costanza, et al., 1996, p. 
3).  In fact, another important characteristic of the ecological economics approach is a rejection 
of the positive/normative dichotomy.  ￿Vision￿ includes both positive and normative elements; 
in ecological economics, the relationship of positive and normative is ￿best viewed as a complex 
interaction across a continuum, rather than a simple dichotomy￿ (Costanza, et al., 1996, p. 2). 
In such an approach, ￿[v]ision has to be flexible and evolving￿ (Costanza, et al., 1997, 
pp. 179).  This allows vision￿like analysis, as we shall see￿to become both a skill that can be 
improved: ￿The skill of visioning is one that can be developed, like any human skill, through 
practice￿ (Meadows, 1996, p. 117); and itself a method of problem-solving: 
Vision has an astonishing power to open the mind to possibilities￿ Vision widens my choices, 
shows me creative new directions.  It helps me see good-news stories, pockets of reality that 
could be seeds of a wider vision. (Meadows, 1996, p. 123) 
 
  Visions and envisioning are at the heart of the methodology of ecological economics 
(see also Costanza, 2001).  A vision of a sustainable society is a necessary pre-requisite to 
devising policies for its attainment.  Moreover, visions and the envisioning process can assist in 
the discovery of such policies.  Vision is where everything starts￿it is pre-analytical.  As such, 
what follows the vision is analysis.  Analysis attempts to link the imagined future back to the 
present reality:  
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visions can heighten the contrast between what is and what might be.  They also can suggest 
starting points for effecting a transition from the one to the other. (Prugh, et al., 2000, p. 44) 
 
  Ecological economics uses structural analysis to build scenarios.  Scenario here is used 
somewhat differently than in Heilbroner￿s discussion of the worldly philosophers￿ scenarios.  In 
the latter case, a scenario was a dramatic set of prognoses concerning where the system was 
heading; scenario here is a possible route leading to the vision of the future: 
In structural economics each scenario about the future could (if one wished) be viewed as a 
hypothesis or an experiment.  But the feasibility at issue is mainly that of the scenario itself, or 
perhaps of a family of related scenarios, rather than the validity of the theory or model. (Duchin, 
1998, p. 6) 
 
Like visions, scenarios combine elements traditionally viewed as either positive or normative: 
Scenario storylines can embody a mixture of prospective elements (these being descriptive of a 
possible future) and normative elements (these being ￿intended￿ or ￿desired￿ aspects); but the 
way these elements combine together can vary a lot.  (Ryan, et al., 1998, p. 239) 
 
Thus, analysis in ecological economics does not employ the traditional hypothetico-
deductive method (Duchin, 1998, p. 6).  Crafting scenarios, like visions, also draws on 
imagination: 
[T]he fundamental challenge facing civic society today is to figure out what our options are for 
dealing with social and environmental problems.  This requires an act of imagination￿the 
ability to describe novel, untried, but plausible solutions that could represent dramatic departures 
from present practices￿Interestingly, the scientific tradition explicitly acknowledges the 
importance of curiosity about how things work, but not of imagination￿the ability to conceive 
of how things might work differently.  Subsequently, the alternative options, based on 
imaginative scenarios, require systematic analysis to determine their feasibility and other 
characteristics￿The scenarios are a translation of the acts of imagination about what could be 
done into the language of the model. (Duchin, 1998, p. 5) 
 
Thus imagination works in tandem with analysis, including multiple forms of problem-solving 
approaches: 
Not only imagination but also inductive reasoning and intuition play a large and explicitly 
recognized role in the development of theory in structural economics. (Duchin, 1998, p. 6) 
 
The nature of environmental challenges means that we cannot afford to allow economics 
to determine the ￿ends￿ as in the traditional approach, which claims to find the ￿optimal level of 
pollution￿ through Pigouvian taxes or fees.  Instead, the ends are derived through careful 
consideration of available scientific information and the ￿precautionary principle￿ of erring on  
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the side of caution.  Analysis then ￿works backwards￿ from the vision of the desired ends to 
find suitable sustainable paths for its attainment: 
Pervasive externalities, such as the possibility of global climate change, have countless facets 
and are created by such a vast, complex, interdependent and difficult-to-assess web of economic 
actions that the calculation of the myriad taxes necessary to get the price right is beyond human 
capability and would be meaningless even if possible.  In these cases, it would be more sensible 
to work backwards (my emphasis) from a determination of the maximum possible scale (or 
better yet, the optimum desirable scale) of the global economy, which is more readily definable, 
and then let [economics work] within those limits. (Prugh, et al., 1995, pp. 132-133) 
 
  Of course, ￿ends￿ are not static, and the means-ends dichotomy is also rejected.  Rather, 
an adaptive and flexible approach is taken that continuously re-evaluates each situation in the 
light of new developments and new information: 
The path toward a vision reveals new information, models, and possibilities as one moves along. 
(Meadows, 1996, p. 123) 
 
Movement toward sustainability will have to be incremental and adaptive (open to feedback). 
(Prugh, et al., 2000, p. 61) 
 
  The principles of flexibility and adaptability emphasized by ecological economists mean 
that the researcher must remain open to making adjustments: 
the implementation path is never clear at first.  It only reveals itself, step by step￿ holding to the 
vision and being flexible about the path is the only way to find the path. (Meadows, 1996, p. 
122) 
 
This is especially important given ecological economists recognize radical or fundamental 
uncertainty: 
[Adaptive management is] an approach to natural resource policy that embodies a simple 
imperative: policies are experiments; learn from them.  In order to live, we use the resources of 
the world, but we do not understand nature well enough to know how to live harmoniously 
within environmental limits.  Adaptive management takes that uncertainty seriously, treating 
human interventions in natural systems as experimental probes.  (Kai Lee, 1993, p. 9, quoted in 
Prugh, et al., 2000, p. 32) 
 
  While ecological economics has taken a pluralistic approach to methodological issues, 
there are common themes that can be found in the ecological economics literature.  The 
importance of vision, analysis (including structural analysis), scenarios, and implementation are 
discussed over and over again by ecological economists.  The meaning of these terms in 
ecological economics is related but not identical to their use in Heilbroner￿s worldly philosophy.  
But the ecological economists￿ use of the terms is very close to their use in Lowe￿s Political  
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Economics or instrumental analysis, also supported by Heilbroner as the appropriate method for 
the contemporary era. 
 
LOWE￿S POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
Heilbroner and Lowe both came to the conclusion that, in a sense, worldly philosophy is no 
longer possible.  Nevertheless, rather than the notions of ￿vision,￿ ￿analysis,￿ and ￿scenario￿ 
being thrown away, they need only to be modified in the context of Lowe￿s instrumental 
analysis.  Vision in this context refers to Heilbroner￿s ￿desired destinations￿￿goals such as a 
sustainable society.  Scenarios here are possible routes connecting the vision of the desired 
future back to the present￿Heilbroner￿s  ￿blueprints.￿  Analysis in this context is the method of 
discovery￿the means by which scenarios are discerned.  The distinction between vision and 
ideology still holds￿a vision is not ideology (in the negative sense) as long as it is consciously 
stated and critically examined.  Thus Heilbroner￿s worldly philosophy remains relevant as well. 
  In Lowe￿s instrumental method, rather than taking only the initial conditions as given 
and addressing theory to predicting outcomes, he proposed also taking as given a pre-
determined end-state: a vision of the desired outcomes.  The task then becomes the derivation￿
the discovery￿of the technical and social path(s) by which these outcomes might be achieved 
(structural analysis; note Lowe uses this term in the same sense as Duchin, not surprising since 
the latter was a protØgØ of Lowe￿s colleague at Kiel University in the 1920s, Leontief), the 
behavioral and motivational patterns capable of setting the system onto a suitable path (force 
[i.e., motivational and behavioral] analysis), the environmental context(s) capable of 
encouraging or inducing these patterns, and policies shaping/creating the environmental 
context(s).  The instrumental method is thus a regressive procedure, beginning from where we 
want to go (pre-analytical vision) and working backwards (analysis) to our present state, or a 
state within our present reach (Lowe, 1977[1965]: 143-44).  The derivation of a suitable path is 
a scenario.  It is derived by working backwards.  Now the execution of the plan may commence, 
working forward from our present state along the path we have outlined via the analysis. 
  Lowe briefly mentions in several places the affinity of his instrumentalism with certain 
ideas of others.  In particular, he cites the pragmaticist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce￿s 
concept of ￿retroduction￿ (and especially Norwood Hanson￿s elaboration of that concept), the 
mathematician Georges Polya￿s work on ￿heuristics￿, and physical chemist and philosopher of  
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science Michael Polanyi￿s explorations of ￿tacit knowledge￿ as all bearing strong family 
relationships with aspects of his instrumentalism (see Forstater, 1999). 
Polya devoted much work to heuristics, whose aim he states is to ￿study the methods and 
rules of discovery and invention￿ (1957 [1945], p. 112).  Central to heuristics is the regressive 
procedure Polya refers to as ￿working backwards.￿  Polya notes that the Greek geometers, who 
called the procedure ￿analysis￿ (meaning ￿solution backwards￿ in Greek), attributed its 
discovery to Plato (Polya, 1984[1958], pp. 575-76).  Consider Polya￿s translation of a passage 
from the seventh book of Pappus￿ Collectiones concerning ￿analyomenos,￿ which Polya 
translates as ￿Treasury of Analysis,￿ ￿Art of Solving Problems,￿ or ￿Heuristic￿ (Polya, 1957 [ 
1945], p. 141): 
In analysis, we start from what is required, we take it for granted, and we draw consequences 
from it, and consequences from the consequences, till we reach a point we can use as a starting 
point in synthesis.  For in analysis, we assume what is required to be done as already done (what 
is sought is already found, what we have to prove as true).  We inquire from what antecedent the 
desired result could be derived; then we inquire again what could be the antecedent of that 
antecedent, and so on, until passing from antecedent to antecedent, we come eventually upon 
something already known or admittedly true.  This procedure we call analysis, or solution 
backwards, or regressive reasoning. (ibid., p. 142) 
 
This procedure is contrasted with synthesis: 
[I]n synthesis, reversing the process, we start from the point which we reached last of all in the 
analysis, from the thing already known or admittedly true.  We derive from it what preceded it in 
the analysis, and go on making derivations until, retracing our steps, we finally arrive at what is 
required.  This procedure we call synthesis, or constructive solution, or progressive reasoning. 
(ibid.) 
 
Synthesis, Polya writes, is ￿translation of the ideas into action,￿ or implementation (ibid., p. 
145): 
The same objects fill the analysis and synthesis; ￿the analysis consists in thoughts, the synthesis 
in acts.  There is another difference; the order is reversed￿ [T]he first desire from which the 
analysis starts￿is the last act with which the synthesis ends￿ Analysis comes naturally first, 
synthesis afterwards; analysis is invention, synthesis execution; analysis is devising a plan, 
synthesis carrying through the plan. (ibid., pp. 145-46). 
 
￿Observe,￿ urges Polya, ￿planning and execution proceed in opposite directions￿ (Polya, 1981 




  Ecological economists such as Costanza have emphasized the importance of both 
analysis and synthesis: 
The arts focus on teaching people to synthesize, the sciences focus on teaching people to analyze.  
All human activities require a balance between synthesis and analysis￿ our educational system 
could benefit￿by a much more explicit attempt to teach both synthesis and analysis 
skills￿across the entire academic spectrum. (1997, p. xiii) 
 
Here the notions of analysis and synthesis are left underdeveloped.  It may be that, given 
ecological economists￿ recognition of the necessity of working backwards from a pre-analytical 
vision of the desired future to the present state, adoption of the Lowe/Polya notions of analysis 
and synthesis may aid in the development of the methodology of ecological economics. 
  In addition to Polya￿s heuristics, Lowe also likens the instrumental method to Peirce￿s 
abduction or retroduction.  These terms refer to what Peirce described as a third type of 
inference in addition to deduction and induction.  For Peirce, retroduction is the only kind of 
inference that is capable of creating new knowledge.  Peirce follower and elaborator Norwood 
Hanson finds the following distinction useful: 
1)  reasons for accepting some hypothesis H 
2)  reasons for entertaining some hypothesis H 
Retroduction concerns the second; it is about hypothesis formulation and selection, 
rather than rejecting or accepting some already formulated hypothesis.  Retroduction is 
complementary to deduction and induction, but retroduction is the ￿first step in scientific 
reasoning￿ (Fann, 1970, p. 35).  Once an hypothesis is adopted, the next step is ￿to trace out its 
necessary and probable consequences.  This step is deduction￿ (Peirce, CWVII, p. 203).  The 
next step is to compare the actual results with what was expected, that is induction.  Likewise, 
Lowe also sees a role for deductive and inductive reasoning as complementing retroduction.  
We have seen that ecological economists refer to other types of reasoning (Duchin￿s reference 
to ￿not only imagination but also inductive reasoning and intuition￿ above), but they have not 
(to my knowledge) explored the role of retroduction.  Since Peirce refers to retroduction as 
reasoning from consequent to antecedent, or inferring a cause from its effect￿i.e. working 
backwards￿it may assist ecological economics in developing its methodology to explicitly 
explore the notion. 
  Like ecological economists, Lowe￿s framework rejects the positive/normative 
dichotomy.  Lowe refers to the approach that begins analysis without consideration of a vision 
of the future as ￿a radical positivism interested only in the explanation and prediction of  
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movements ￿wherever they might lead￿￿ (Lowe, 1969, p. 7). For Lowe, the separation of the 
positive and normative ￿can no longer be justified;...recent developments demand the conscious 
integration of the analytical and normative aspects￿ (1967, p. 180). 
  Peirce and Hanson disagree with the common view that there is no ￿logic of scientific 
discovery.￿  For Peirce, retroduction is not bogged down by rules, but it does have a logical 
form: 
  The surprising fact C is observed. 
  If A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
  Hence there is reason to expect that C may be true. (CWV, p. 189) 
 
Here, Peirce is retroducing from the present to the past, while Lowe￿s instrumental 
inference, like ecological economics, is moving from the vision of the desired future to the 
present, but both are employing the regressive procedure. 
  We have seen above that Duchin contrasts the ecological economists￿ method of 
structural analysis with the hypothetico-deductive method.  Lowe and Hanson similarly reject 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning as irrelevant for instrumental or abductive inference (Lowe 
sees a role for deduction, but this is what he calls instrumental-deduction rather than hypothetic-
deduction, since the conditions are not given, but must be stated by the vision). 
Hanson, following Peirce, has investigated the difference between retroductive and 
deductive reasoning to highlight both that there is a logic to retroduction and that its logic is 
distinctive.  One scientist argues from premises A, B, C and hypothesis H to conclusion D.  
Another encounters an anomaly D, and ￿cojoins this statement with A, B, and C so as to 
￿corner￿ an hypothesis H which, when bracketed with A, B, and C will possibly ￿explain￿ D.  
Both scientists are arguing, both have been using their brains.  Differently!￿ (Hanson, 1965, p. 
64).  Whether one works the problem from the bottom up or the top down, the question is 
whether there is a route connecting A, B, C with D.  The logical form of the argument once we 
have worked backwards to the beginning looks the same: some logical route connects A, B, C, 
H with D.  We can state this regardless of whether we have arrived at this state via progressive 
reasoning from A, B, C, H to D or regressive reasoning from D back to A, B, C, H.  Likewise, 
Hanson argues, if no route connects A, B, C, and H to D then neither retroduction from D or 
hypothetic-deduction from A, B, C, H will be forthcoming (1965, p. 58).  But, he insists, the ￿de  
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facto conceptual development within the problem-solving context￿are different￿ in the two 
cases, ￿and not only psychologically so!￿ (1965, p. 61). 
 
  Insight into a key difference is provided by Hanson: 
From￿A, B, C, H, any two result[s]￿(e.g., D1 and D2) must themselves be consistent.  
Whereas, given any two sets of premises￿A, B, C, H as against A￿, B￿, C￿, H￿￿either of which 
may resolve￿D, it is not the case that these be mutually consistent. (1965, p. 61) 
 
The point is to get to D.  Working backward from D, we may find a number of routes, 
say A, B, C + H1 or H2 or H3, where there is no need for the Hs to be mutually consistent￿they 
are alternative suitable paths (Hanson, 1965, pp. 60-61).  Working forward from A, B, C + H, 
all the members of the attainable set D1, 2, 3￿n must be mutually consistent; there may be better 
paths, but we will not find them working forward: we may not find a suitable path, or we may 
not find the best suitable path.  Moreover, Lowe stresses that it is through the instrumental 
procedure that we discover the Hs themselves: 
If it is true that￿rules are indispensable data for instrumental analysis, why bother with a 
regressive derivation of the suitable path instead of deducing them in the usual fashion from the 
knowledge of the rules and the initial conditions?  The answer is simple.  Once we know which 
members of the total set of￿rules are goal-adequate, we can indeed deduce the path in the 
conventional manner.  The first step of instrumental analysis is to provide us with precisely this 
knowledge. (Lowe, 1969, p. 183). 
 
  Like the ecological economists, Lowe￿s notion of instrumental inference recognizes that 
problem solving requires going beyond the rational.  Instrumental inference is characterized by 
Lowe as a ￿search procedure￿ and ￿a mental technique of problem-solving￿ in which solutions 
are ￿discovered￿ or ￿hit upon￿through what [Michael] Polanyi calls a logical ￿leap￿￿ (Lowe, 
1977 [1965], p. 145): ￿But they are not leaps in the dark￿[O]ur search is guided by past 
experience, analogies, and other clues.  Yet it remains true that our ultimate insight springs from 
a non-rational act of ￿imagination￿￿ (Lowe, 1992, p. 327). 
  Lowe and the ecological economists share an emphasis on the role of non-rational 
imagination.  While ecological economists mention it, and many certainly exercise imagination, 
the literature does not really explore it much further.  Lowe, drawing on Polya, Peirce, Polanyi 
and others, explores the procedure further, and in ways that may assist ecological economists.  
Polya has identified the ￿first task￿ as that of ￿collect[ing] and classify[ing] such problem 
solving procedures￿ and to ￿develop a repertory of problem solving techniques￿ (1984[1971], p. 
590).  Even this will not solve the problem comprehensively, because there is still the task of  
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choosing among the available techniques, a decision that will require that the investigator ￿use 
personal judgment, as Polanyi would say.￿   This is similar to Lowe￿s discussion of choosing 
from among alternative hypotheses: 
There are no binding rules, according to which the researcher could decide in favor of one 
among many possible hypotheses.  Which one he chooses in the end, adopting￿Einstein￿s ￿free 
creation of the mind￿, is neither a strictly determinable nor an arbitrary decision. (Lowe, 1992, p. 
327). 
 
  For Polanyi, appreciation of a problem is itself part of the act of discovery (1958, p. 
121).  Seeing a problem ￿is a definite addition to our knowledge,￿ and ￿to recognize a problem 
that can be solved and is worth solving is a discovery in its own right￿ (1958, p. 120).  In the 
process, a ￿heuristic stress￿ builds, which is akin to an emotional strain on the part of the 
investigator.  Discovery leads to a release, e.g., running through the streets crying ￿Eureka!￿ 
(1958, p. 122). 
  One heuristic tactic noted by Polanyi is to continuously reorganize the problem ￿with a 
view to eliciting some new suggestive aspects of it￿ (1958, p. 128).  This is reminiscent of C. 
Wright Mills￿ suggestion that ￿the re-arranging of the [researcher￿s] file￿is one way to invite 
the [sociological] imagination (1959, p. 212): 
Imagination is often successfully invited by putting together hitherto isolated items, by finding 
unsuspecting connections￿As you re-arrange a filing system, you often find that you are, as it 
were, loosening your imagination.  Apparently this occurs by means of your attempt to combine 
various ideas and notes on different topics.  It is sort of a logic of combination, and ￿chance￿ 
sometimes plays a curiously large part in it.  In a relaxed way, you try to engage your intellectual 
resources￿Of course, you will have in mind several problems on which you are actively 
working, but you also try to be passively receptive to unforeseen and unplanned linkages (Mills, 
1959, p. 201, 212) 
 
Both Polanyi and Mills relate this ￿reorganizing￿ tactic with another, what Polanyi refers to as 
￿ransack[ing] our memory for any similar problem￿ (1958, p. 128) and Mills calls ￿get[ting] a 
comparative grip on the materials￿ (1959, p. 215).  Polya writes: 
Any conjecture, of course, must have been suggested￿by somehow related ideas (special cases, 
analogies, etc.), although, perhaps, at the moment of conceiving the conjecture those ideas were 
not clearly and explicitly present. (Polya, 1984[1948], p. 474) 
 
Thus, writes Lowe, in seeking to discover the suitable path or paths to the realization of 
the vision of the desired outcomes, ￿our search is guided by past experience, analogies, and 
other clues￿ (Lowe, 1992, p. 327).  
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  In the course of the heuristic search, we must look for ￿favorable signs,￿ which of course 
must not be mistaken for ￿proof￿ but which encourage ￿further investigation￿ (Polya, 
1984[1948], p. 490).  Lowe cautions that ￿the findings of heuristic analysis can be accepted only 
provisionally￿ (1992, p. 327).  Polya invokes the notions of the ￿bright idea￿ and ￿feeling we 
are ￿on the right track￿￿ to get at the seemingly intuitive aspects of the discovery procedure 
(ibid.).  For Polanyi, ￿success depends ultimately on the capacity for sensing the presence of yet 
unrevealed logical relations between conditions of the problem, the theorems unknown￿, and 
the unknown solution￿￿ (1958, p. 128).  Polanyi invokes the ￿common experience(s) of 
groping for a forgotten name￿ and searching for a name or word that is said to be ￿on the tip of 
the tongue￿ to illustrate the ￿sense of growing proximity to the solution￿ that guides discovery 
(1958, pp. 128-29).  As Lowe puts it, the ￿researcher ￿senses￿ a structural relationship between 
the hypothesis he chooses and the problem he wants to solve￿ (1992, p. 327). 
  Equally important is Polanyi￿s suggestion that self-awareness of the capacity to sense the 
￿accessibility of a hidden inference,￿ as well as of the ability to ￿invent transformations of the 
premises which would increase accessibility￿ is a ￿foreknowledge￿ which itself ￿biases our 
guesses in the right direction￿ (1958, p. 129).  The discovery-enhancing effects of our ability to 
discover is also related by Polanyi to the fact that ￿a set purpose may automatically result in 
action later on￿ as when we go to bed resolved to wake up at a certain hour and then do (ibid.).  
These factors also help explain the ￿self-accelerating manner of the final stages of solution,￿ 
i.e., the closer we get the faster we progress (ibid.).  These aspects of discovery are not treated 
lightly by Polanyi, who takes the position that ￿the whole process of discovery and confirmation 
ultimately relies on our own crediting of our own vision￿ (1958, p. 130). 
  Echoing the remarks of the ecological economists above, Peirce also believed abductive 
reasoning to be ￿a skill that could be improved by practice or discipline￿ (Ochs, 1993, p. 61).  
And all the authors also see important roles for both common-sense and imagination in 
discovery. 
  Lowe￿s Political Economics, with its instrumental analysis, has some important points of 
contact with themes raised in discussions of the methodology of ecological economics.  But 
while ecological economics has raised certain issues, it has not elaborated them.  It has been the 
purpose of this section to not only point out some of the connections, but to give a peek at the 





Adolph Lowe and Robert Heilbroner were both aware of the environmental challenges facing 
humanity from quite early on in their work and quite ahead of their time.  In addition, both 
Lowe￿s Economics and Sociology (and related writings) and Heilbroner￿s Worldly Philosophy 
(itself influenced by this work of Lowe) recognized the endogeneity of the natural environment, 
the impact of human activity on the environment, and the implications of this for questions of 
method.  Lowe and Heilbroner also became increasingly concerned with issues related to the 
environment over time, such that these issues became of prime importance in their frameworks.  
This work deals directly with the ecological and environmental issues; both authors also dealt 
with other issues that relate to the environmental challenge, such as technological change.  But it 
is not only their work that explicitly addresses the environment or relates to environmental 
challenges that is relevant to the concerns of ecological economists.  Heilbroner￿s Worldly 
Philosophy and Lowe￿s Political Economics offer insights that may prove useful in developing a 
methodology of ecological economics.  The connections are almost uncanny.  Ecological 
economists have taken a pluralistic approach to methodology, but the common themes in this 
work regarding the importance and nature of vision, of analysis (including structural analysis), 
scenarios, implementation, of the necessity of working backwards, of the role for imagination, 
rejecting the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive/normative dichotomy, and so on, all 
are issues that have been elaborated in Lowe￿s work, and in ways that are relevant to ecological 
economics.  There are additional issues that we have not had time to elaborate￿Heilbroner￿s 
Visions of the Future, e.g., would merit another whole section, at least.  But the goal of the 
paper is actually quite modest: to make ecological economists aware of the works of the two 
authors, and get them interested enough to explore the possible contribution of these ideas to 
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